In a a handwritten note by J D Higham to the Governor of Singapore (FCO141/15298), he writes:
“Lee Kuan Yew’s personal position is difficult. He himself doubts whether he can even keep any real real control of or exert influence over the rank and file of the party. He is valued by them for his advocacy but as a field commander not the grand strategist. He is attempting to build up his own personal bloc of supporters from the Straits Chinese bourgeoisie and may succeed in this. If he succeeds he might seek to leave the PAP and join the forces of moderation, but this is extremely doubtful he would certainly only do so as leader and would not play second fiddle to Marshall”
In the 24th November 1955, The Governor of Singapore in his “statement of his views on the possible realignment of political parties” said this about the PAP:
“Its [The PAP’s] future is defined more simply, even if deceptive in its simplicity. It must strive for independence which for them cannot come too son. Moderation therefore is not its policy, but a temporarily necessary tactic owing to lack of opportunity for any other. Being a party of an idea, rather than of a detailed policy, the Assembly is its sounding board to build a volume of opinion and a satellite of organizations which at the appropriate time will sweep it to unchallengeable power. Yet there are differences within the party.”
“While Lee Kuan Yew subscribed unequivocally to the policy of an immediate independent democratic, non communist Malaya, there are others who seek the first three attributes with its greater opportunity of reversing the fourth. The PAP cannot for these reasons, in spite of its Popular Front tactics recently adopted, form a government with its opposition colleagues.”
Even at this early stage the British Government had formed the opinion that the left wing influence in the PAP was a threat that needed to be culled.